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Abstract During the 1990s radical changes took place in marine ecosystems, 
fisheries and fishing communities around the North Atlantic. Social-ecological 
restructuring involving interactive changes in marine ecosystems, harvest tech-
nologies, fisheries science, management practices and goals, fishing households 
and communities and markets radically transformed fisheries associations. This 
article draws on insights from multiple sources, including a series of career his-
tory and other semi-structured interviews with fishers from Newfoundland and 
Labrador and Norway. These insights are presented in the form of career histories 
of two fishers, one from North Norway and one from Labrador on Canada’s east 
coast. These career histories are contextualized within the larger literature on the 
post-World War II history of these two regions and the resulting descriptions are 
used to inform the design of three ideal types of fishery associations (organic, 
mechanical and cybernetic) that capture three main phases of interactive social-
ecological restructuring during this period. Our argument is that today’s North 
Atlantic harvesters are increasingly embedded in cybernetic fisheries organiza-
tions that are radically different from the forms of association that dominated in 
the past. In our analysis and conclusion we highlight the sustainability challenges 
and opportunities this process of cyborgization poses for these fishers and for 
North Atlantic fisheries in the future.
Introduction
Interactive social-ecological restructuring (Ommer et al. 2007) has radically trans-
formed fisheries science and management practices, as well as marine ecosys-
tems, harvest technologies, fishing households and communities, and markets 
within North Atlantic fisheries in the post World War II period. Establishment of 
Exclusive Economic Zones (eezs) in the late 1970s in accordance with the Law of 
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the Sea provided the legal framework for coastal states to establish and implement 
national laws and regulations to control fisheries and some other activities within 
a 200 nautical mile limit (Caddy and Cochrane 2001). In the 1980s the eez frame-
work, coupled with persistent social, economic and conservation concerns, con-
tributed to the development of a complex array of management mechanisms for 
limiting access, conducting stock assessments, and setting and allocating harvest 
shares in many fisheries. By the 1990s a series of events helped move concerns 
about sustainability to the foreground of fisheries discussions at national and in-
ternational levels, including The Report of the World Commission on Environ-
ment and Development in 1987 (World Commission on Environment and Devel-
opment 1987), the collapse of major, managed fish stocks (such as the groundfish 
stocks in Eastern Canada), and mounting evidence that humans are fishing down 
marine food chains around the world (Pauly and Maclean 2003).
Today, all of the major fisheries in the North Atlantic feature some com-
bination of State management with efforts to get harvesters to assume greater 
responsibilities for management in return for their rights to fish (Caddy and Co-
chrane 2001; Holm 2001; Holm and Nielsen 2007). Accordingly, recent social-eco-
logical thinking has emphasized the complexity of fisheries governance, distin-
guishing between the ‘system to be governed’ and the ‘governance system’ and/or 
questioning the effectiveness of centralized state management systems (Kooiman 
et al. 2005). In this article we seek to further this thinking by building on earlier 
research in North Norway and in Newfoundland and Labrador (nl) in Eastern 
Canada (Johnsen 2005; Murray et al. 2006) in which we treat fishers as part of 
relational networks.
In this article we use the term ‘fishing association’ to describe the changing 
networks of relations between people, the environment, management, technology, 
the economy, and other material, cultural and symbolic objects that make it pos-
sible for humans to fish or do other fisheries-related operations in different times 
and places (Johnsen 2005; Murray et al. 2006; Latour 2005). Inspired by Burns and 
Stalker (1964) we also distinguish between associations and organizations suggest-
ing that while associations are organic and incrementally developed assemblages 
of relations forming certain patterns, organizations are particular forms of associa-
tions with formal bureaucratic structures, instrumental purposes and more defined 
objectives. An organization is founded on rationalistic ideas, scientific concepts and 
can be seen as ‘a rational instrument engineered to do a job’ (Selznick 1957:5).
To explore changes over time in the properties and attributes of ‘fishing as-
sociations’ we use information derived from career history interviews with older, 
smaller vessel fish harvesters in Newfoundland and Labrador and North Norway. 
To communicate the character and complexity of the changes in these fisheries 
from the point of view of the harvesters involved, we elaborate two comparative 
and exploratory case studies of the relational changes in fishing associations, 
drawing on interviews with two cod fishers, Richard from Lofoten in Norway and 
Ben from Labrador on Canada’s north-east coast.1
We use these case studies to develop a conceptual framework that describes 
shifts across three ideal types, from ‘organic associations’ to ‘mechanical associa-
tions’ and towards ‘cybernetic organizations’. In our analysis and conclusion we 
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raise questions about future directions in fisheries and the challenges and oppor-
tunities associated with integrating sustainability, effective monitoring, regula-
tion and management for the public good into cybernetic fishing organizations. 
The relational changes in the organisation of fishing enterprises – processes we 
call cyborgization – have implications for the future, not least because the techni-
cal and organizational ability to catch fish of cybernetic organizations is much 
higher than the catching ability of the organic associations they have begun to 
replace (Hersoug 2005:242-243; Johnsen 2005; 2008; Murray et al. 2006).
Approach and Methods
The article draws upon material from multiple research projects. The interview 
with Ben is one of ten semi-structured interviews with ‘expert’ fishermen in nl 
undertaken in 2003 by Murray and Johnsen. These interviews are part of a series 
of fifty-six similar career history interviews carried out in different areas of New-
foundland and Labrador between 2001 and 2003. The Norwegian material con-
sists of twenty-four semi-structured interviews with fishers carried out in 1997, a 
group interview carried out in 2001, and participant observation by Johnsen on a 
fishing boat in 2007. In addition to the results of these formal interviews, we also 
draw on interviews with other fish harvesters from the area, informal discussions 
with fishers in community meetings, on boats and in harbours, and with fisher-
ies managers and people from harvester organizations. In contextualizing these 
interviews we also draw on document analysis, archival sources, research articles, 
and systematic observations of technological and organizational changes in Nor-
wegian and nl fisheries.
From this material we have chosen to organize our analysis around the 
careers of ‘Ben’ and ‘Richard’, two informants who actively adapted to environ-
mental and managerial changes over their careers in ways that illustrate larger 
associational changes in the smaller boat sectors of Newfoundland and Labrador 
and Norway over the past forty years. We interweave stories of the changes these 
individuals described with a description of changes (derived from both our own 
research and an analysis of the relevant literature) within the larger social-ecolog-
ical systems within which these individuals are embedded.
Fisheries associations in Norway and Newfoundland and Labrador after 
World War II
Prior to (roughly) the 1960s in both Norway and nl, fishing was basically a house-
hold and community-based activity in which all or most family members par-
ticipated, often in cooperation with other households (see also Jentoft 1993; Holm 
1995; Kennedy 1996; Ommer 2002). Indeed, the boundaries between fishing op-
erations, households, and community were fuzzy, often entailing collective, life-
long and multi-generational membership in each, and fishers were socialized into 
collectives that shared many practices, values and beliefs (Anderson and Wadel 
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1972; Wadel and Jentoft 1984). In the Labrador small boat cod trap fishery, for ex-
ample, which operated until the 1990s, the berths for these large, fixed net boxes 
with leaders were inherited through family relations in some areas while in other 
areas access was determined through annual community-level lotteries or ‘draws’ 
(Kennedy 1996; Jentoft 2004). These associations differed from place to place and 
over time (for example the particular vessels/crews involved in hauling the traps 
or the particular individuals on the ‘stage’ processing fish could vary).2
During this phase in both Norway and nl, children began this process of 
socialization early, beginning work at the age of ten or even younger (Jentoft 1984; 
Kennedy 1996). As our informants from Northern Norway and nl told us, they 
were ‘born into’ the fisheries, with little chance or opportunity to do other things. 
For example, cod-tongue cutting was an important activity for many young boys 
and girls in Northern Norway (and still is in some cases) and, at least until the 
early 1980s many youngsters baited longlines after school hours. In nl they some-
times also cut cod tongues for sale and were expected to work without a wage in 
order to contribute to the collective welfare.3 Commercial and subsistence fisher-
ies were largely the same in this respect (and to varying degrees these overlapped). 
Ben’s story helps to illustrate the nature of these fishing associations.
Ben (Newfoundland and Labrador)
Ben is from a fishing community in south-eastern Labrador. Labrador fisheries 
are predominantly conducted in the spring, summer and fall (due in large part to 
winter ice) and cod, salmon and seals were the main species historically harvest-
ed. In the past, Ben’s family – like many others – moved between coastal summer 
communities and inland winter communities. Prior to the start of the cod trap 
fishery, many fished for Atlantic salmon with salmon gill nets and participated in 
the seal fishery, often travelling to do so. Indeed, for many coastal fishermen like 
Ben, salmon landings were more important economically than cod landings.
In the cod fishery, the family had its own berths, near those from other 
members of the same community, and the fishery was organized as a family op-
eration. As a child Ben fished with his father and uncles without his own wage. 
The younger children and the women processed the fish at the ‘stage’ and men 
hauled the cod traps (and helped in the processing in between hauling the traps). 
They also used jiggers and hand-lines for cod in the early and later parts of the sea-
son in the area around their fishing station. Ben’s first duty as a young boy (about 
ten years old) entering the fishery was to move the fish from the floor up onto the 
gutting and splitting table located on the stage. Until he was fourteen or fifteen 
years old he did most of his work on the stage though afterwards he went out in 
the boat to help with the cod trap. The cod trap was usually hauled during the ebb 
tide in the morning or the afternoon and, depending on the size, from three to 
seven men were required to haul it. When the trap was empty it was let back into 
the water, ready to continue fishing. All the hauling of the trap was done by hand 
as many of the trap skiffs didn’t have hauling equipment. After hauling the traps 
the crew returned home for meals taken with the rest of the family.
This coastal cod fishery by local Labrador fishermen had long co-existed 
with a migratory fishery from the Island of Newfoundland and elsewhere that was 
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prosecuted using similar gears from shore-based stations and from schooners. 
The migratory cod fishery largely disappeared in the 1950s but was soon replaced 
in the adjacent offshore areas by a fairly intensive offshore international dragger 
fishery. Cod landings from the coastal fishery appear to have drawn largely on 
shoreward feeding migrations from offshore banks with some possible supple-
mentation of landings from bay stocks of ‘golden’ or ‘brown’ cod such as those 
recently identified in Gilbert Bay, Labrador (Wroblewski et al. 2005).
As we turn to Richard’s story from Norway we can see some basic similari-
ties with the Labrador fishery.
Richard (Norway)
Richard was born on Lofoten Island in Northern Norway and started baiting lines 
when he was around eight years old. After that he began to train as a ‘landman’ 
which, in Richard’s case, denotes an apprentice position where young boys worked 
for a partial share together with the adult landman to learn about the gear (in Nor-
way ‘landman’ refers both to a shore-based role associated with certain tasks and 
to a particular pay status. A fully-fledged landman is a crewmember who takes 
care of and organises all the work with the gear on shore and receives a full share 
in the coastal longline fishery for cod and haddock). As an apprentice landman 
Richard learned by doing all the skills (baiting, knots, splices. etcetera) needed 
for rigging, maintaining, and preparing the gear. He had to perform well on land 
before he was permitted to go out fishing, beginning on shorter trips substituting 
for fishers who were sick or who wanted a short break. Richard also began whal-
ing in the summer around twelve years of age. During the winter he would both 
attend school and apprentice as a landman until he was finally able to sign on full 
time at the age of eighteen or nineteen.
Our informants fit into a well-described pattern around the North Atlantic 
where, during this period, fishers were embedded in their local communities, 
engaged in a seasonal multi-species fishery and intensive subsistence activities. 
Fishing crews were household and family-based and constituted by the affective 
relations (largely kinship based) that existed in the local institutional framework. 
Heterogeneous fisheries associations were constituted inside the boundaries of 
households and local communities, through organic and incremental develop-
ment processes (with the exception of connections to international markets and 
marketing firms) in intimate relationships with local marine and terrestrial eco-
systems. Knowledge was experiential and associated with local ecosystems (or 
what we call Local Ecological Knowledge or lek) with fishing success mediated to a 
substantial degree by intimate and closely guarded knowledge of fishing grounds, 
fish behaviour, and local fishing practices. Fishing was almost exclusively a male 
domain with women extensively involved in processing the fish, childcare, sub-
sistence and book-keeping and preparation for fishing (Skaptadottir and Proppe 
2005; Kennedy 1996; Jentoft 2004; Neis 1999, Gerrard 1983, 2008). This was the 
general pattern (with important local variations) in the cod and groundfish fisher-
ies in Norway, the nl cod trap fishery (Johnsen 2005; Murray et al. 2006), and in 
other cod fisheries around the North Atlantic.
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During this time, behaviour and relations were mediated by very few 
explicit, formal controls and regulatory mechanisms (Jentoft 2004; Jentoft et al. 
2005; Johnson et al. 2005). Governance was primarily based on production and cir-
culation of lek and other forms of practical knowledge infused with implicit and 
internalised community-based control mechanisms, and based on social interven-
tions and sanctions realized through the affective relations between and within 
fishing associations. Formal or explicit mechanisms for information collection, 
processing, and control, as well as for interventions and sanctions were very lim-
ited and were often oral versus written (Pascual-Fernández et al. 2005). The rules 
and codes for conduct were implicit, tacit and a part of the actors’ perceived ‘objec-
tive reality’ (Berger and Luckman 1991 [1967]). In this context, when the interna-
lised codes of conduct were broken, sanctions would often be implemented and 
enforced by the collective.
Locally, boats could become known as ‘bad’ or ‘good’ boats and skippers 
could acquire the status of ‘crooks’ or ‘heroes’. Many adaptations were possible 
inside these associations and governance was a cooperative effort mediated by 
gender, leadership, age and other primarily local factors. As a result, the organiza-
tional patterns, structures, technologies and knowledge associated with fisheries 
and marine ecosystems varied substantially within and between Norway and nl 
(Anderson and Wadel 1972; Wadel and Jentoft 1984). While local and individual 
adaptations were often rather fixed and specialised, in the fisheries as a whole 
there was a lot of flexibility and associated capacity to respond to change (Barth 
1972). The Norwegian fisher–peasant household, for example, combined fishing 
and farming in many different ways that contributed to the development of rather 
resilient communities (Brox 1966; Brox et al. 2006).
‘Modernization’ and Systems in Change
After World War II, these fishing associations came to be seen as economically 
marginal, irrational and one of the causes for low economic productivity in both 
Norway and nl. In nl, a focus on lack of growth, poor product quality, sector stag-
nation and inefficiency was one starting point for a process of restructuring on 
the coast (Sinclair 1987). Both the Canadian federal government (which acquired 
jurisdiction over fish harvesting in nl in 1949) and the Norwegian government ap-
plied an industrial development model to fisheries in order to promote stability as 
well as technological and economic modernisation (Hersoug 2005; Wright 2001). 
These initiatives also included efforts to ‘modernize’ the fish processing industry 
in order to provide the basis for stable incomes, work and settlement in rural areas 
where fisheries had been primarily seasonal with huge fluctuations in landings, 
labour needs, income and market prices. In both contexts, modernization was 
partly financed by the state and was associated with efforts to promote technologi-
cal change in harvesting and processing. This technological change included the 
introduction of such things as wet-fish trawlers and the construction of filleting 
and freezing plants where the organization of work was driven by mechanized 
processing, scientific management principles and a gendered division of labour 
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(Cullum 2003; Hersoug 2005; Neis 1991; Wright 2001). In nl modernization was 
informed by ‘growth centre’ thinking and associated programs to resettle fishers 
and their families into larger centres. The modernization program involved sub-
stantial subsidies in the form of loans and grants to a few integrated frozen fish 
firms that came to dominate nl fisheries (Sinclair 1987; Wright 2001). In most of 
nl except Labrador, the household production of salt cod largely disappeared and 
was replaced by the sale of fresh cod to processing plants. The effects of industrial 
modernization on local fisheries were augmented by the introduction of welfare 
state programs such as free education, pension plans, family allowance and un-
employment insurance for fishermen and fish processing workers employed in 
the new fish plants, increasing access to cash for investment in new technologies, 
and youth out-migration from fishing communities and fisheries in the 1960s and 
1970s (Neis 1993; McCay 1976 ).
In Norway the number of persons and vessels involved in the fisheries 
declined between 1960-1978, but the productivity measured in tons captured per 
fisher increased from about sixty to one hundred (Director of Fisheries).4 From 
1978 to 1990 the total catch and the productivity per fisher decreased, but stronger 
national control was exercised due to the establishment of the 200 mile eez. In nl 
the fishing fleet was also modernizing and becoming more capital intensive dur-
ing this period, and landings increased up to the late 1960s when, probably due 
to intense foreign fishing, they started to decline – though the modernisation of 
the fleet continued (Murray et al, 2008). Indeed, throughout the 1970s and 1980s 
engine sizes, the level of technology, and investments increased in the Norwegian 
and Newfoundland fishing fleets (Jentoft 2004; Murray et al. 2006, 2008).
The stories of both Richard and Ben illustrate how these prodigious efforts 
to modernize fisheries in nl and Norway, while not always achieving the goals of 
their proponents, resulted in major changes to fisheries.
Richard: Modernisation in Norway
In 1978 Richard decided to become a fulltime fisher again (after working some 
years in the merchant fleet) and he bought the thirty-eight foot vessel that he is 
still using. This vessel is a traditional Norwegian coastal design with the wheel-
house at the stern and the working area on the foredeck. He fished for cod al-
most year-round, specializing in longlines – the fishery he learned in Lofoten and 
an important fishery in the Finnmark community where he eventually settled. 
Although he was an experienced fisher, Richard had to learn the local fishing 
grounds and conditions in his new community and he struggled to make a living 
in the first few years. However, help from local, experienced people and invest-
ment in a decca navigator helped him learn the local grounds. When a divorce left 
him a single parent with primary responsibility for his children, the closeness of 
these grounds allowed Richard to maintain ‘almost normal’ working hours while 
spending more time with his children.
The cod fishery in Finnmark is largely a mobile winter and spring fishery. 
In the long lining fishery, fishers fished between fifteen and eighteen tubs of gear 
per vessel with approximately 300 baited hooks in each tub. The gear was hauled 
and reset every day the weather allowed and the lines were usually deployed in 
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two fleets, usually with seven to nine tubs in each fleet. In the cod fishery season, 
Richard usually fished with one shareman onboard and one landman who led a 
group hired to bait lines on shore. To make the baiting more effective, Richard 
organized his baiting station after guidelines from a fisheries technology research 
institute. Baiters were paid per hook baited and not with a share of the catch like 
the landman. Richard preferred to employ people from the Lofoten Islands as 
landmen and sharemen. When Richard and his shareman came to the grounds 
they would haul a fleet from the previous day, set a new one and let it soak for a 
while, haul that one in and set a last fleet before they returned to land with the 
catch and the unbaited lines. At that time, many coastal vessels did not leave the 
gear behind for the next day, fishing instead with only two fleets. Richard’s ‘three 
fleet’ approach was more effective. On the other hand, it required more gear be-
cause he always had baited gear in the water. In the relatively open access long line 
fishery that existed up to 1988, Richard fished cod like this from October to Feb-
ruary. During the rest of the season he jigged (with automatic jigging machines) 
until the haddock long line fishery started in the summer.
Technological modernization and organizational changes made it possible 
for Richard to adapt to a new environment. Richard’s story also points to a profes-
sionalization process in that he hired crew from outside the area, used hired bait-
ers on shore, and organized his fishery in a formal way, including following ‘scien-
tific’ procedures for baiting. In short, Richard was running a small-scale fishing 
organization that was different in many ways from the associations of the past. In 
Richard’s case, part of his rationale was to be able to combine his work at sea with 
his obligations as a single parent – but these changes were not unique to Richard’s 
networks and practices. In this period of transition, the whole Norwegian fishing 
fleet went through a process of technological and social modernisation (Johnsen 
2004, 2005). Ben’s story illustrates how parallel changes were occurring on the 
other side of the Atlantic:
Ben: Modernisation in nl
Ben built a fifty-two foot ‘longliner’ in 1969 (in nl, ‘longliner’ refers to a decked 
fishing vessel up to sixty-five feet, used for various types of fishing). One of the 
reasons Ben started to build a new boat was that the cod trap fishery had started 
to decline (due in part to offshore trawler activity) and, like others from both Lab-
rador and the island of Newfoundland, he wanted to fish more gillnets and steam 
farther away in order to access still-abundant grounds. Ben also travelled while 
doing surveying work with the boat and sailed along the coast to collect salmon 
for processors. Ben became the first in his area for whom the longliner/gillnet ap-
proach became the main cod fishery. The technological jump from trap skiff and 
cod trap to longliner and gillnets also involved the purchase of a sounder, a gurdy 
(a mechanical hauling aid) and a radio, allowing them to stay out for several days. 
Although Ben’s longliner crew was still family-based, the link to the local com-
munity was weaker because he was travelling further away to fish, and spending 
significantly more time away from home. Ben and his crew (there were four men 
onboard for gill netting and three when collecting salmon) had transitioned from 
stationary harvesters using fixed gear on traditional grounds (cod-trapping) to mi-
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grating fish hunters and a more active fishing approach. Ben continued fishing for 
cod until a moratorium on fishing the northern cod stocks off the northeast coast 
of Newfoundland and Labrador was declared in 1992.
During this era, the local and larger scale associations within which each 
fisherman was embedded began to change as well. Ben’s new activities like sur-
veying and collecting salmon along the coast changed his planning and the way 
he organized his fishing. He also increased his mobility and added new technol-
ogy. Richard started to hire people from outside and, like other harvesters, started 
to use new technology, enhancing the efficiency of his operation.
While modernization ideas had begun to influence policy before the es-
tablishment of the eezs in the late 1970s, the legal framework associated with the 
eezs and other emerging requirements to manage stocks for optimum or ‘maxi-
mum sustainable’ yield supported rapid change in the institutional arrangements 
and policies governing fisheries (Hardin 1968; Hannesson 1978, 2005; Holm 2001; 
Johnsen 2005; Charles 1997; Caddy and Cochrane 2001). In Canada, the establish-
ment of the 200-mile eez led to enclosure of the fisheries by the federal state. 
Management based on Total Allowable Catches (tac) was introduced in the 1970s, 
and reflected a growing emphasis on limiting entry into fisheries (Mansfield 
2004; Kirby 1982) through increased use of limited access licenses and, in eastern 
Canada, the introduction of Enterprise Allocations (eas) and Individual Quota (iq) 
programs in some fisheries. Limited entry was instituted for the under sixtyfive 
otter trawl groundfish fleet beginning in 1977, for example, and eas were estab-
lished in the offshore groundfish sector in nl in 1982 (Gough 2006). Most of the 
newer Atlantic fisheries such as shrimp and crab were organized around limited 
entry licensing. In the case of cod and other groundfish stocks, quotas were set 
too high in the 1980s and not strictly enforced, contributing to stock collapse in 
the early 1990s (Finlayson 1994). This resulted in the Moratorium on the fishing 
of ‘Northern’ cod, which included the cod stocks off Labrador and northeast New-
foundland, in 1992.
In Norway the first step towards limited access occurred in the herring fish-
eries, where a licence system was established in 1973 (Johnsen 2004). Until around 
1990 this fishery was an exception to the open access principle that had persisted 
in the rest of the Norwegian fisheries. After 1990, when scientists reported the col-
lapse of the Northern cod stocks, the coastal cod fishery was closed and new mea-
sures to limit access and manage the fisheries were introduced (Gerrard 2008).
When groundfish stocks collapsed in the North Atlantic in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s, many explanations were put forward (for a nl overview see Hutch-
ings, 1996), but the explanation that was most forcefully embraced by policy-mak-
ers and industry leaders was that the collapse was the result of ‘too many fishers 
chasing too few fish’. Despite some differences in management instruments and 
practices, the theoretical and ideological bases for the Canadian and Norwegian 
management regimes during and since the modernization period continue to 
have a lot in common and the industry and stock recovery strategies that have 
been embraced most forcefully focus on increased individualization and privatiza-
tion of resource access, and professionalization. These initiatives are underpinned 
by a ‘bio-economic’ modelling framework (Finlayson 1994; Wright 2001; Apostle 
Mast Vol 7_004.indd   63 24-4-2009   10:59:00
MAST 2009, 7(2): 55-8264
et al. 2002; Johnsen 2004). Bio-economic modelling combines Beverton and Holt’s 
(1957) population dynamic model from biology with micro-economic models for 
human behaviour where assumptions about nature and fisher behaviour under 
different conditions are integrated (Holm 2001). The models were designed to 
deal with the problems caused by fisheries that are assumed to be open access 
in the absence of state intervention (Matthews 1993). Where differences exist be-
tween nl and Norway in terms of instruments and mechanisms, they reflect dif-
ferent histories and different stages in the process of abandoning the traditions 
and structures associated with community-based fisheries (where access was to 
substantially mediated by knowledge, kinship, limits on wealth, technologies and 
constraints on use rights) and transitioning to more technocratic, professional-
ized, ‘rational’, individualized and more privatised fisheries with less attachment 
to communities.
The interactive social-ecological restructuring that contributed to the col-
lapse of groundfish stocks in nl and North Norway in the late 1980s and early 
1990s and the changes that have taken place since then, particularly in fisheries 
management, have substantially changed the lives and practices of Ben, Richard 
and other small boat fishers and fishery communities in both regions.
Ben – Surviving the Northern Cod Moratorium
With the Moratorium on fishing for northern cod in 1992, Ben and his sons took 
up salmon fishing from a speedboat (a much smaller vessel than their longliner) 
and also fished whelk, lumpfish, and scallop. These were bad times and by 1995 
the commercial salmon fishery had also been closed. Ben obtained a snow crab 
license around 1992, but he did not use it initially because their speedboat was 
too small and not rigged for crab. However, with the salmon fishery gone and 
access to other species very limited (particularly in Southern Labrador) they soon 
decided that they had to try snow crab fishing.5
In Labrador, the snow crab fishery starts in mid-June and continues until 
the boats have caught their quotas. Each boat has a license that allows them to fish 
in a particular large nafo area (2J in this case). Furthermore, they are supposed 
to keep log books that must be updated on a regular basis and they also occasion-
ally are required to bring observers on board when they go fishing. The observers 
monitor their catches which are also monitored more routinely at the dock. Fish-
ers are obliged to sort out the smaller female crabs and undersized males, and 
return them to the water (males of legal size are kept alive in the hold). Snowcrab 
is fished with pots and Ben and his sons invested in a new boat and gear in order 
to participate. Navigation skills are very important as vessels cover large distances, 
and fishing occurs very far out (sometimes more than 100 miles offshore). In the 
beginning, there was a lot of crab and they had good catches. The boat was only 
forty feet long though, like most nl boats, she was very heavy and robust. After 
two years they lengthened the boat to fifty feet, made her wider and deeper, and 
installed a bigger engine. Ben and his sons started with 300 pots (pots are divided 
into strings with fifty pots on each) but ultimately roughly tripled the number of 
pots they were fishing. Today, this vessel is fully equipped for offshore crab fish-
ing, with sophisticated communications and fish-finding electronics, and power-
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ful hauling equipment. Ben fished until he retired a few years ago and handed 
the business over to his oldest son, who at the time of the interview had been the 
skipper for several years.
Ben’s fishery and way of life have changed a lot since he started. Like other 
fishing families from this Southern Labrador community, twenty-five years ago 
his fishing family stopped moving back and forth between summer and winter 
communities and gave up using their summer fishing station when the cod and 
salmon fisheries were closed. Over his career, Ben changed from being an inshore 
cod and salmon fisher in a trap skiff, returning back home for meals and to sleep, 
and became, instead, an offshore crab fisher in a limited access fishery, sleeping 
onboard his boat during longer fishing trips, and surrounded by technology and 
enmeshed in regulations that governed when and where he could fish, the species 
he could target, the timing and length of fishing seasons, the type, design and 
amount of gear he could use, his vessel size and design, and the training he and 
his sons and grandsons needed to have in order to retain their right to fish.
Like Ben, Richard also had to cope with a number of radical changes to his 
‘network of relations’.
Richard: Entangled in New Relations
As a consequence of a 1988/89 cod stock collapse, the Norwegian fishery was 
abruptly closed and a more complex regulatory system was developed for the 
coastal fishery. The cod collapse and the introduction of individual vessel quotas 
in 1990 occurred at the worst possible time for Richard as he had recently invested 
in a new engine and renovations to his boathouse and baiting station. To adapt, 
the first thing he did was to reduce the size of his crew and to involve himself more 
in baiting. After a difficult first year (1990) Richard decided to try something new. 
With his efficient fishing practices and the small individual quota of cod available 
to him his season would have been over in a very short time if he directly targeted 
cod as he had in the past. Furthermore, under the new regulations the by-catch 
of cod in other fisheries was deducted from his quota, meaning that if he fished 
all his cod directly he could not fish for other species if there was a cod by-catch. 
Richard therefore decided not to fish directly for cod, and started in January to 
fish for haddock, which was not a quota-based fishery. While haddock and cod are 
often abundant on the same grounds, fishing practices and gear design can be 
used to minimize cod by-catch. By rigging the lines in different ways, and with 
his knowledge about fish behaviour and abundance, he was able to fish haddock 
and slowly catch his limited cod quota at the same time. In this way Richard could 
continue to fish over a longer period and get good catches of haddock with fulfil-
ment of his cod quota as a bonus. Thus, while the rest of the local fleet took their 
cod quotas early in the season and adapted to the regulations by stopping fishing, 
Richard was able to continue fishing all winter by changing his practice.
After the winter cod season was over, despite the stock collapse, there was 
so much cod on the fishing grounds around Richard’s home that the fleet could 
not fish haddock without getting too much cod.6 The result was that almost the 
whole fleet that depended heavily on cod and haddock was forced to abandon the 
summer haddock fishery. Richard, however, fished for wolffish in the summer, 
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but rigged his lines so he could get cod as a by-catch. To avoid the problem of 
getting too much cod on any one day and too little on others, he negotiated with 
the local fisheries authorities for a weekly rather than a daily by-catch allowance. 
Because the situation was new for both fishers and managers, the interpretation 
and enforcement of rules and regulations were not yet clearly defined giving him 
the latitude to negotiate this accommodation. Overall, Richard’s strategies allowed 
him to expand his options by adapting to the situation and learning to navigate the 
new world of logbooks, quotas and by-catch reporting and control systems.
Richard’s access to knowledge and technology and his organizational 
changes helped him adapt to the cod closure, regulatory change and the new 
quota system. Skills he had learned as a young fisher in Lofoten, the use of new 
technology like the decca which translated the natural environment into a sym-
bolic world, and his ability to negotiate the new set of formal rules governing the 
fishery were all important. Even though he was more creative than many others, 
Richard was not unique. Almost all of our Norwegian and Newfoundland infor-
mants told similar stories about how they acquired new knowledge, changed their 
social relations, used new technology, and applied the organizing principles that 
these technologies required to adapt to new situations (Johnsen 2002, 2004; Mur-
ray et al. 2006).
From Organic Fishery Associations to Cybernetic Organizations
As noted in the introduction, our focus is on the relational attributes of fishing 
actors. In this conceptualization, the acts and processes of fishing are not just the 
activities of individual human beings, but are instead the result of a complex set 
of interactions within the associations in which individual human beings are em-
bedded. To understand the acts and processes of fishing (a critical pre-condition 
for effective management) one must therefore better understand the nature and 
dynamics of these associations. Our focus on two individuals allows us to con-
sider the dynamism and evolution of the associations in which they have been 
embedded over their lengthy careers, as well as to highlight the similarities and 
differences in the trajectories of the two fishers and the two areas – thereby illus-
trating the variety of processes by which change occurs.
We have constructed three ideal types of fishing associations; organic, 
mechanistic and cybernetic, based on our case studies of fisher career histories 
from Norway and nl, as well as related descriptions in Johnsen (2005) and Mur-
ray et al. (2006). These three ideal types characterize and help us conceptualize 
the relational changes in these North Atlantic fisheries over the past fifty years. 
Clearly, the processes we described above have been uneven, are incomplete and 
ongoing, and do not entail a linear or categorical transition from one fixed state (or 
one ideal type) to another. However, while these and other fishing associations do 
not fall neatly into one of these ideal types, the elaboration of these types can bring 
into the foreground some of the fundamental elements in these fisheries and help 
us see more clearly the dynamics and consequences of interactive social-ecological 
change as well as their relevance for future options.
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The case study descriptions we present above are consonant with a sig-
nificant body of literature from both Norway and nl that characterizes what is 
thought of as the traditional organisation of fishing communities associated with 
the pre- and early post World War II period (Anderson and Wadel 1972; Barth 1972, 
Brox 1996; Brox et al. 2006). Here we conceptualize this traditional organization as 
consisting of organic associations. Organic associations are the collective outcome 
of the ad hoc organization of everyday life in response to and in interaction with 
primarily local and immediate social-ecological environments. Organic associa-
tions are not organised on the basis of explicit formulated laws, abstract formal 
plans, explicit strategies, explicit, generalised knowledge, or on principles or ideol-
ogies that operate at macro spatial, temporal or organizational scales. Rather, they 
develop incrementally and pragmatically and can vary substantially from place to 
place and over time – that is, they are diverse and patchy. Organic associations are 
largely based on perceived reality, tacit or vernacular knowledge, apprenticeship 
versus formal education, and are thus guided by local history and practice.
Within organic associations, practices and activities are continuously ad-
justed in response to daily experiences in order to accommodate environmental, 
economic and social constraints and fluctuations. These associations are largely 
situated within a local structural, symbolic and normative setting, though they 
have long been (as in the case of the Newfoundland and Labrador and Norwegian 
fisheries) vulnerable to ‘exogenous’ shifts and changes in larger physical, biologi-
cal, economic, religious and socio-political environments. Thus, the principles 
of organization within organic associations can be characterized as ad hoc and 
situational. Moreover, the structures of communication and decision-making in 
organic associations are not formally organised or bureaucratic, but rather are 
heavily shaped and patterned by local environments, relationships, hierarchies, 
norms and values.
The social relations in organic associations are largely affective, by which we 
mean they are close and personal without necessarily being equitable. In a fisheries 
setting, the owners and the crew are often members of the same community, fam-
ily or household and are fishing together on a common resource, as well as often 
working together in other spheres (for example, subsistence agriculture, hunting, 
home construction). The crew are often hired on an informal and personal basis 
and work responsibilities and catch shares are based on trust, respect or depend-
ence, traditions, family or community obligations, different types of reciprocity, 
and other informal arrangements, rather than on formalized agreements, cash 
exchanges, rules and regulations and professional qualifications.
While the mechanics of capture within organic fishing associations re-
quire a kind of structured organisation of technologies, work sequences and roles, 
each of these can be expected to vary to some degree across seasons, fisheries, 
and within and between households and communities. Technologies are loosely 
coupled to the association and necessary adaptations are made in practical situa-
tions. Therefore, the who, how and what of the performance of practical fishing 
activities often differs across seasons, over life cycles, and between fishing vessels, 
due to differences in the options, resources, challenges and experiences of crew 
and skippers, applied local knowledge and practical situations.
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In organic associations, communication, socialization, and decision-mak-
ing take place primarily through face-to-face relations and interactions between 
close acquaintances, as with children and parents, master and apprentice, skipper 
and crew, fisher and merchant or fish buyer and among community members 
(Berger and Luckman 1991 [1967]). They also take place in close interaction with 
complex, dynamic and variable experienced physical and biological environments 
over which harvesters exercise little control. Knowledge is primarily local, the 
product of intergenerational and intra-community communication and accumu-
lated experience. The main basis for future action and decision-making is accu-
mulated localised and situated experiences and observations from the past based 
on direct experience and intergenerational transfer of knowledge, and operational 
decisions are based on the actual conditions encountered.
In organic associations, control tends to be implicit and internalised; gen-
eralized reciprocity and local power dynamics may be integral to their operation 
(Burns and Stalker 1994 [1961]; Scott 1988; Ouchi 1980). In this sense they are 
largely self-governing (Kooiman et al. 2005). Organic associations can produce 
a sense of community and may be characterised by cooperative action, but can 
also be characterized by short or even extended periods of conflict and informal 
sanctions. Hence, power relations and decision-making processes in the associa-
tion are mediated by a whole range of internal and external factors which can 
vary considerably within and across communities. These processes can be both 
horizontal and vertical and are frequently mediated by gender, class, generation, 
kinship, religion and local tradition as much or more than by law and regula-
tion. Horizontally, decisions can be based to varying degrees on tradition, beliefs 
and ongoing negotiation among community members about crucial strategic is-
sues for the fishing association including fishing seasons, access to grounds and 
berths, and when and where it is safe to fish. Vertically, the local merchant or 
buyer and the skipper will often make tactical decisions for the fishing operation 
including those related to cash expenditures, what species to target, the choice of 
gear and bait, hours of work, divisions of labour and final products. Furthermore, 
decision-making and risk handling are often ad hoc and situational rather than 
planned, formalized and programmed.
Fisheries as organic associations are the ontological point of departure for 
the contextualist tradition in fisheries management within which fishing actors 
are seen as relational actors embedded in communities and social networks and 
where attention is paid to the potential for community-based management within 
fisheries (Apostle et al. 2002; Jentoft 1993; Jentoft 2000; Jentoft and Kristoffer-
sen 1989). Perhaps most importantly, organic associations are also sometimes re-
garded as adaptive and resilient for societies dealing with unstable environments 
(Burns and Stalker 1994 [1961]:121-125; Scott 1988; Ouchi 1980) although they were 
also often associated with poverty and resource degradation (Cadigan 2003).
In post World War II fisheries in Norway and nl, interactive restructuring 
began to change organic associated fisheries into more mechanistic associations 
(Hersoug 2006; Wright 2001). As we have seen, to varying degrees and at varying 
times, western North Atlantic fisheries transitioned towards the mechanistic as-
sociative form in the last quarter of the twentieth century. The extension of the 
Mast Vol 7_004.indd   68 24-4-2009   10:59:01
MAST 2009, 7(2): 55-82 69 
200 mile eezs supported this transformation but it was never complete or evenly 
established and was deeper and more obvious on the large, corporate-owned trawl-
ers and in processing plants. Mechanistic associations are characterised by the dif-
ferentiation of functional tasks and are organised on the basis of more abstract 
and generalised principles than are found in organic associations. In mechanistic 
associations more formal, often external and bureaucratic structures and mecha-
nisms for management, regulation and communication are introduced into fish-
eries that are defined as public resources in order to limit access or exploitation of 
fisheries resources. Corporate ownership of harvesting and processing technol-
ogy increases and science, economics, engineering and scientific management 
are applied in an effort to make fisheries more efficient, ‘rational’ and predictable. 
The functionality of mechanistic associations rests upon the development of a 
formal governing system and (based on an implicit principle of differentiation of 
tasks) a division between the system-to-be-governed and the governing system, which 
takes on a somewhat formalized, rule-based and hierarchical organizational form 
(Burns and Stalker 1992 [1961]:120).
In mechanistic fishing associations, production is more capital intensive 
and work relationships, roles and responsibilities are more integrated and stand-
ardized than in organic associations. Whereas people are born and socialised or 
informally apprenticed into organic associated fisheries, they tend to be hired into 
mechanistic associated fisheries. Relationships in mechanistic associations are 
more contractual, formalised and less likely to be based on affective relationships. 
Tasks and responsibilities are more defined, structured and organized around 
functional divisions of labour. While flexibility in work organization is still need-
ed skippers increasingly require formal schooling and crew members start to oc-
cupy specific positions (for example bosun or mate) within a more hierarchical 
structure.
Within mechanistic fishing associations, communication and training are 
largely accomplished through specialized and formal structures guided by increas-
ingly formalized curriculum and certification procedures. This is what Berger 
and Luckman (1991 [1967]) call secondary socialisation. In this context, knowledge 
becomes more explicit, abstract and general and is inscribed in objects like manu-
als, books and technologies that can be transported in time and space. Over time, 
the texts, tools, procedures and technologies in mechanistic associated fisheries 
become agents for change, and because they can be evaluated, reproduced and 
systematically transferred, they gradually undermine support for organic associ-
ated processes and practices that can not be easily evaluated by formal standards 
and transferred through formal procedures.
Power relations in mechanistic associations are more vertical and linked 
to formal and functional hierarchies of control and procedures. Decision-making, 
as in the case of decisions regarding whether or not to sail and when to stop fish-
ing, are more likely to be guided by formal procedures rather than experience and 
tradition. Decisions are regarded as ‘rational’ when they are guided by formal, sci-
entific or managerial knowledge that defines the relationship between causes and 
effects and means and ends. Mechanistic fishing associations rely on a centralized 
system for management, control and intervention informed by classical fisher-
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ies bio-economics and related mechanisms designed to motivate (through formal 
incentives and/or sanctions) actors, conceptualized as economically rational indi-
viduals, to behave in a predictable and prescribed way (Gordon 1954; Schrank et 
al. 2003).
By the late 1980s and early 1990s stock collapses and the associated erosion 
of science-based state management’s perceived legitimacy (Arnason et al. 2003; 
Finlayson 1994), the sheer size and cost of the management bureaucracy and con-
trol mechanisms,7 and broader shifts in power relationships, technologies, and 
state policies had helped fuel a shift towards a new fisheries form that we call cy-
bernetic organizations. Cybernetic fishery organizations are techno-scientific systems 
(Haraway 1997) and, metaphorically, the word implies a relatively seamless joining 
of the human and the non-human; a tighter, more refined and more extreme inte-
gration/fusion of the fisherman with a larger network of human and non-human 
elements than is found in mechanistic and organic fishery associations.8 In cyber-
netic organizations structures and relations become more highly formalised and 
contractual including relations with both human and non-human elements (that 
is, the fish) (Mirowski 2002). Cybernetic fishery associations interact with the fish 
and the biophysical environment through relationships organized by more for-
mal ownership versus usufruct property relations, science, rhetoric, control and 
monitoring, and mechanisms for risk assessment, modeling and handling. They 
are full of symbolic and material mechanisms like rules, prescriptions, proce-
dures, advanced information and calculation systems and computers that shape, 
control, govern and structure action and relations. They are also associated with 
efforts to formalize and solidify relations among people and between people and 
fish through the introduction of individual quotas (iqs) and, in the ideal form, 
transferability of those quotas (itqs). Creating a formal, contractual property rela-
tionship between harvesters and fish and then making that property transferable 
integrates the fish and the fisher more tightly into larger corporate and financial 
networks. Fish become an ‘asset’ of the enterprise to be bought, sold and specu-
lated on in new ways.
Power in cybernetic organizations is partly vertical, in the sense that the 
associations respond to top-down decisions, but power is also ‘delegated’ as it is 
built into the work procedures onboard and into contractual and property rela-
tions. When the skipper and the crew fish for quotas or carry out quality control 
by following a certain (and eventually taken for granted) procedure they are exer-
cising delegated power. Hence, control becomes implicit in the work operation. In 
this operation, skippers are transformed into ‘professionals’ with qualifications, 
skills, roles, functions and responsibilities and expected to self-regulate in the 
context of oversight by their professional association and by occasional external 
intervention.
In cybernetic organizations external regulation and monitoring tend to be 
replaced by indicators and formalised feedback mechanisms that are often tech-
nologically-mediated and trigger responses and interventions when requirements 
are not met. Holm (1996) and Holm and Nielsen (2007) describe modern North 
Sea fisheries management as a cybernetic system for regulating fishing activities 
based on the development and deployment of an abstract, symbolic and formal 
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system of knowledge. It is a system for handling uncertainties by way of mech-
anisms for counting, calculation and prediction, and technologies for feedback 
and intervention – what they call the Total Allowable Catch (tac)-Machine.9 The 
theory of the Tragedy of the Commons and its economically rational actor logic, 
and the Gordon-Schaefer bio-economic model are examples of the representations 
and concepts used in the tac-Machine. The tac-machine integrates a system of 
scientific representation with ‘technologies of intervention’ like the tac (with its 
individual fishing quotas) in order to achieve, from the resource managers’ point 
of view, more rational control over fishers and fisheries (Holm and Nielsen 2007). 
Ideally, according to Holm and Nielsen, the tac-machine integrates the governing 
system and the system-to-be-governed.
In addition to ever more effective catch technology, cybernetic fishing or-
ganizations utilize modern navigation, communication and information technol-
ogy, like Global Positioning Systems (gps), internet, satellite and mobile phone 
connections that both increase the amount of information and the speed of in-
formation collection and exchange. These technologies can also be used to enact 
intervention mechanisms such as tac/individual quotas and other regulatory con-
trols such as the use of ‘black box’ real-time gps location monitoring devices.
Scientific models such as the Gordon-Schaefer model also increasingly in-
fluence procedures onboard the fishing vessel, a process that is reinforced as fish-
ers become professional actors expected to actively contribute to the production of 
scientific knowledge and economic information that feed into the management 
process. In Newfoundland and Labrador and in Norway some fishers are trained 
to do sampling for scientific stock assessment and are sometimes paid to help 
with those stock assessments (Murray et al. 2005).10
Within contemporary resource management in Norway and nl, access to 
fish has become a limited right and becoming a licence holder (a ‘new’ compo-
nent) means not only a right, but also an obligation to fish. Once fishers have this 
right, they risk losing it if they don’t fish the full quota, or if they derive too much 
of their income from other sources. Moreover, the right to fish comes with obli-
gations related to fishing, training, management and conservation that shapes, 
sometimes inequitably, who has access to those rights (MacDonald et al., in press). 
The fishing quota is technically a ‘privilege’ provided by the Minister of Fisher-
ies but is generally and increasingly treated as property by the parties involved 
so long as the requirements are followed. Fishing rights and quota systems have 
integrated the fish into the fishing organization in new ways in the sense that fish 
can now sometimes be bought in the form of vessel or individual quotas which are 
sometimes formally transferable and often informally controlled through leases 
or other mechanisms when formal transfer is not supposed to take place.
The fishers who survived and/or succeeded have been those who have been in 
a position to adapt to and integrate resource management into their practice, diver-
sify into other species, move to new, unfamiliar areas, and who have bought bigger 
boats at great cost with gear and technology they have had to learn about quickly and 
often at great personal risk (Dolan et al. 2005). The flip side of survival is accepting 
some substantial integration into and development towards new and more cybernetic 
fishing organizations.11 These organizations are the fishing actors of today.
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Table 1 summarizes the attributes of the organic and mechanistic associa-
tions and cybernetic organizations.
Table 1. Types of fishing organizations 
Attributes Organic associations Mechanistic Associations Cybernetic 
Organizations
Relations to fish Common resource with 
 access mediated by kinship, 
local knowledge,  technology, 
practice
State resource with state 
regulated access 
Towards  privatization 
or propitiation of 
resources
Social structure and 
relations 




Participants Members of community and 
visitors
Open access and after 
EEZ state mediated 
 access linked to 
citizenship (Neis 1991)
Professional  specialists
Technology  Loosely coupled to the 
association
Integrated in the 
organization





Ad Hoc organic and 
situational, mediated by 
kinship, gender, age 
Scientific management, 





for evaluation and 
 modelling
Power Horizontal and vertical but 
dispersed and fluid 
Vertical and formally 
structured
Vertical and delegated, 
formally structured
Decision making and 
risk handling













control and enforcement 
of procedures, increased 




control systems, highly 
specialised roles
Local embeddedness Embedded in community Partly embedded in 
community.
Embedded in 
 professional networks 
Crew relations Informal and personal Increased  formalisation Contractual
Knowledge Experiential, implicit, partly 
tacit, personal and embodied





and scientific, with 
 systems for knowledge 
accumulation in the 
organization
Rationality Local, reciprocal, ‘way of life’, 
survival
Economic and local Economic 
and scientific, 
entrepreneurial













Self-governing Explicit governing 
system
Governing system and 
system to be governed 
become integrated. 
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To varying degrees in different fisheries, quotas, reporting systems, log 
books, and ‘black boxes’ (gps-based vessel-monitoring systems) and other new 
devices for fishing, control, and feedback have all come to shape fish, fishers, orga-
nizational forms and fishery performance in new ways in recent decades. Ben and 
Richard have not only adapted to regulations, they have both to some degree in-
ternalised them into their practices. The stories of both Ben and Richard provide 
examples of the increasing integration of fishing activities and relationships into 
more structured and formalised systems. Richard negotiated an interpretation 
and enforcement mechanism that fit his practice, and he took increasing respon-
sibility for fitting his activity into new frameworks. In Ben and other crab fishers’ 
cases, their licence is issued for a certain area and they have to keep logbooks and 
deal with observers and dockside monitoring. Logbooks and licences for certain 
areas are devices that insert regulation into daily activities and that can be used for 
system and performance evaluation in addition to monitoring practices at sea on a 
daily basis. In this sense they are components in cybernetic feedback systems and 
are thus part of a process by which the governance system and the system-to-be-
governed (Kooiman et al. 2005) become more closely integrated.
This phenomenon of integration also extends to markets where, in Norway, 
the skippers in certain fisheries through online communication with the sales 
organization can get fisheries reports, send catch reports and sell fish.12 These 
communication opportunities increase their ability to handle information and to 
respond on the basis of that information. Norwegian pelagic fisheries provide an 
extreme example of a situation where vessel, management, and market are closely 
integrated (see Johnsen et al. this issue). Similarly, many Norwegian and nl fish-
ers no longer make their own gear as most is now bought rigged and ready from 
gear factories. In Norway, these gear factories also store it between seasons. Thus 
more and more of these and other services are taken care of by specialised suppli-
ers who have become a part of the fishing organisation (Johnsen 2005).
Conclusion
Radical changes have occurred in North Atlantic fisheries over the past few de-
cades. Ben and Richard’s stories are about changes in two fishing associations that 
‘survived’, but many didn’t. Richard was able to link his practices to an expanded 
and increasingly cybernetic network and continue fishing for groundfish because 
the cod stocks were healthier in Norway than off Labrador (and the moratorium 
was soon lifted) and because he was embedded in relations within the Lofoten 
fishery. When Richard moved to Finnmark, he became the link between two dif-
ferent systems of practices and knowledge. He utilized his knowledge from the 
organic fishing associations of the 1960s to find the specialists needed to run a 
more cybernetic fishery in the 1990s. Like those of his colleagues who succeeded, 
Richard adapted to the introduction of formal management regimes in Norway’s 
coastal fishery and he started to try to get as much as possible out of his ‘property’, 
the fish that now had become a part of his capital and his ‘enterprise’.
Mast Vol 7_004.indd   73 24-4-2009   10:59:01
MAST 2009, 7(2): 55-8274
On the other side of the North Atlantic, Ben, his family and his crew made 
similar moves to adapt to changes.13 Like Richard, Ben changed grounds, tech-
nology, and knowledge and acquired a new licence and quota as he adapted to a 
new ecological, technological, social, and legal framework. His fishing association 
changed to involve new contents as well as new boundaries. In both cases their 
fishing enterprises became a part of more complex, evolving webs of relations 
extending beyond the boundaries of the vessels and local communities to local, 
regional, national, and international systems, as well as into the sea to new ar-
eas within fluctuating and changing marine ecosystems. In Labrador, where cod 
stocks have not recovered, fishers have had to switch largely to crab to survive, 
forcing them to acquire new technologies and vessels, develop new practices, and 
develop a whole complex of new knowledge (Murray et al. 2006).
By interpreting the interactive, social-ecological restructuring in these 
fisheries as a relational and organizational change from organic associations to cy-
bernetic organizations we have sought to foreground some of the main elements 
of the changes that have taken place in the post World War II fishery. The process 
of cyborgization we associate with the contemporary era creates fewer, but more 
powerful actors on the assumption that science, internalized, professionalized 
practices, and fewer harvesters will protect the fish, improve fisheries incomes 
and reduce industry volatility for the longer term.
While skippers are still sometimes owners in cybernetic fishing organiza-
tions and still make some choices and decisions (Johnsen 2008), the network they 
are part of structures their choices and decision-making alternatives and thereby 
constrains their options and relationships with fish, crew, other skippers, fishing 
communities, future generations, government, buyers and international markets 
in new and fundamental ways. On the one hand management mechanisms con-
tribute to a downsizing of the fisheries, but on the other hand they cause remain-
ing actors to increase the technological and economic efficiency of their hunt, tend 
to concentrate the wealth from fisheries in fewer hands, and often discourage re-
cruitment of young fishers into the small boat fishery. Enhanced efficiency drives 
up the potential threat to limited and frequently degraded resources, augmenting 
requirements for surveillance and control which, in professionalized fisheries, are 
expected to be paid for by fishing organizations that are increasingly constituted 
as business enterprises within which attention to profit and professional codes 
and hierarchies tend to erode reciprocity within and between enterprises and 
across generations. Access to fish and fish resources is now largely disconnected 
from membership in particular communities, and is increasingly professional-
ized, privatized and commercialized.
As long as management ideology and frameworks for analysis give a prom-
inent position to the ‘tragedy of the commons’ as the single factor responsible for 
poverty and resource decline in fisheries, and to ‘economic rationality’, ‘financial 
mechanisms’ and ‘privatization’ as the solution to these problems (Holm 2001; 
Hersoug 2006; Johnsen 2005; Murray et al. 2006; Mansfield 2004), we can expect 
a continued drive towards ever more radical cyborgisation in the fisheries both in 
Norway and nl, and a continued restructuring of fishing practices, communities, 
household and gender relations as a result (Gerrard 2008). Fishing households 
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and community activities in fisheries will continue to be replaced by corporations, 
more effective machines, better gear and better boats. Paradoxically, the contin-
ued growth of cybernetic harvest organizations will help to ensure that fewer 
fishers and fewer boats do not translate into real reductions in capture capacity. 
Efficiency, power, and the need for fish in these cyborgs are so huge that sustain-
ability could become more remote than ever before. As quotas become regarded as 
property and framed inside a certain legal and moralistic framework, it is unclear 
to what extent cybernetic fishing organizations will internalise appropriate rules 
to protect stocks into their daily practices or respond appropriately and quickly 
enough to increasing industrial and environmental volatility. Simultaneously, 
these contemporary cyborgization processes erode the potential and capacity for 
effective, timely external surveillance and intervention.
Today we see some re-emphasis on local ecological knowledge in stock as-
sessment, reliance on more diverse scientific methods, increased user participa-
tion in management, increased monitoring, a reliance on market mechanisms, 
a call for ecosystem approaches to fisheries management (eaf) and a focus on 
oceans rather than just fisheries. The question is how these elements will inter-
face with cybernetic organizations in the future. For instance, is the current tra-
jectory with its focus on quota-based fisheries consistent with an eaf approach or 
does it, instead, run counter to such an approach? Fishing actors are increasingly 
accustomed to external regulation versus informal local management and to mod-
erating their behaviour to adjust to such regulations in ways that may be positive 
or negative for the future of fish, fisheries and fishing communities. If eaf opens 
the door to interventions by new stakeholder groups how will they interact within 
the existing cybernetic system? Will we end up with parallel fishing and eaf pro-
cesses rather than an integrated approach? If fisheries become fully privatized and 
ownership fully transferable; how will this mediate our capacity to regulate the 
industry and manage the resources for the greater public good? We do not yet have 
a clear answer to these questions, in part because the processes we have described 
are still unfolding. Whatever happens there is a clear need to conceptualize the ac-
tors in the fisheries as emergent cybernetic organizations rather than autonomous 
individuals, so we can monitor and model how relations change to become able to 
identify options and challenges for effective governance.
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Notes
1 The story about Richard is built on an interview from 1997 and is supplemented with infor-
mation from an interview in 2002. Parts of this story are presented in Johnsen (2004). The 
interview with “Ben” was done in October 2003. Both are in their sixties today. 
2 “The fishing stage” is the elevated platform on the shore with working tables and sheds 
where the fish is landed, salted, and dried and where the fishing gear is stored.
3 In Norway youths participating in fishing have commonly received a share. 
4 Lecture by the Director of Fisheries 03 September 2004. SjØmat for alle (Seafood for every-
body) - Conference. 2.- 4. September, Bergen, Norway.
5 The nl snow crab fishery started in the 1960s with a relatively small number of limited 
entry licenses. Some supplementary licenses were issued in the 1980s, and in the 1990’s, 
temporary snow crab fishing permits were issued to fishers in vessels under 35 feet in 
length along with often very small individual quotas for crab. These permits were eventu-
ally converted to licenses but individual quotas for the small boat fleet remain very small. 
In Newfoundland, however, the snow crab fishery started in the 1960s, though at a much 
smaller scale (See McCay 1999).
6 The Norwegian cod stock assessment from 1988/89 was later revised and it was suggested 
that the arctic cod stock was in better condition than the scientists thought in 1989. 
7 According to Arnason et. al (2003:168) management costs in nl have varied between 
11-28% of landed value between 1989-1999. In Norway they have dropped from 13 to 11% 
in the same period. In Norway the number of fishers has dropped, while the number of 
bureaucrats has increased. The Norwegian Newspaper, Fiskeribladet Fiskaren, (2. May 2008 
pp-16-17) has estimated the ratio of bureaucrats/fisher to be 0,5. 
8 In technical cybernetics the term Cyborg means cybernetic organism and signifies an ex-
treme interface between human and machine, we use the term Cyborg to refer to cybernetic 
organization, which also allows us to include less extreme interfaces and links.
9 The tac-Machine is the cybernetic system for setting tac in the North Sea Fisheries. It is 
described by Holm and Nielsen (2007). 
10 See also (http://www.imr.no/data/page/6761/HI-tema_nr.3.06_Referanseflaaten.pdf;
11 This process also that brings with it new identities and symbols of masculinity (Power 2008).
12 http://www.rafisklaget.no 
13 See also Murray et al. (2006) where another of our informants; Jack, adapts in similar ways.
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